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6 Abstraction/Representation Theory and
the Natural Science of Computation
Dominic Horsman, Viv Kendon, and Susan Stepney
6.1. Introduction
Is computation an intrinsic property of physical systems, or is there a distinc-
tion between a computer and other objects in the universe? Computer science
as a theoretical discipline, traditionally dealing only with issues of abstract
computation, has tended to ignore this question. Amongst more philosophi-
cal approaches to computing, the first view, pancomputationalism (Piccinini
2017), has been argued for in various guises. Assertions such as “the universe
is a computer” (Ball 2002) are indeed superficially appealing, given the great
success of modern computing theory and technology. Yet they lose their appar-
ent content as we look at them more closely. If everything computes merely by
virtue of existence, then what more do we say about an object when we call it a
computer? How are novel and unconventional computing devices to be charac-
terized, if computing occurs universally and intrinsically in physical objects?
We present here a more discriminating view, in which the use of a phys-
ical system to carry out an abstract process (a computation) depends on a
number of specific properties that both the physical device (the computer)
and physical process (it computing) must have (Section 6.3). Not all physi-
cal processes constitute computing: A key element in physical computation
is the use of a physical system to manipulate the representation of abstractly
encoded data in specific processes. In presenting our framework, Abstrac-
tion/Representation (AR) theory (Horsman et al. 2014; Horsman 2015), we
show that physically carrying out computation and doing science are closely
related activities (Section 6.2). Both involve representational activity. By look-
ing at how computers are developed from both fundamental science and then
engineering and technology, we show the crucial physical nature of computing.
Key to AR theory is the representation relation between physical objects
and objects in the abstract mathematico-logical domain. AR theory takes as
primary a realist physical domain; we discuss other potentially compatible
views in Section 6.2.1. The representation relation is structured and directed,
from physical to abstract: Scientific modeling is fundamental in AR theory.
We consider representation functionally, in terms of its use and properties
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within the physical sciences. We are not primarily concerned with it as seman-
tics or meaning, or, relatedly, as knowledge and information. AR theory’s
construction of computation is not of symbol manipulations, nor are there
notions of representational states (Putnam 1960; Fodor 1975). If science is
to happen in a physical external world, and any part of reality that corresponds
to what is considered as an abstract world (where mathematics, logic, compu-
tations, etc. live), then there must be a map from the physical to that abstract
world: Representation is that map.
AR theory separates out (i) physical systems and processes, (ii) abstract
objects, and (iii) the representation relation that maps between them. Abstract
entities do not mirror physical ones (Putnam 1960; Rorty 1979), but stand in
quasi-functional relations to them. By analyzing the role and specific function-
ality of representation in science and technology, we give the AR framework
for computing in terms of the interrelations of these three elements. In the
specific context of computing, the representation relation allows abstract com-
putations to be instantiated in physical computing systems, and the effects of
physical processes to be represented as abstract computational results. There
are not some physical states that are computational states; rather, there are
computing cycles that require all elements to be present in specific ways before
computing can be said to occur.
AR theory’s analysis of physical computation captures computing in com-
muting-diagrammatic form: Physical computers use representation to act as
predicting devices for the results of abstract computations. This acts as the
converse situation to that of experimental science, where a physical theory
functions as an abstract predictor for the behavior of physical systems. AR
theory shows us the deep structural connections between computing and nat-
ural science. Experimental science and physical computing both require the
interplay of abstract and physical objects. This is mediated via representation
in such a way that the diagrams of AR theory commute: The same result is
gained through either physical or abstract space-time evolution.
The central role of representation leads to the requirement for a repre-
sentational entity. This is the entity that supports the representation relation
between physical and abstract. For the natural sciences, this is the human
experimenter or theorist. Within a computational process this is usually the
programmer, designer, and/or end-user. However, AR theory does not require
the representational entity to be human, or even conscious (Section 6.2.5).
AR theory treats both physical and abstract objects, mediated by represen-
tation, within the same framework. This allows us to discuss the connection
between the scientific description of a system or device (as a theory of physics
or biology, say) and its computational description as two distinct represen-
tations. We can use this distinction in the search for novel systems whose
physical properties allow us to compute in new and interesting ways. Com-
puter science has previously lacked a formal connection between physical
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device and abstract theory. AR theory now provides this, distinguishing the
physical system from its abstract scientific and computational representations.
Conflation of this three-way separation lies at the root of much of the confu-
sion that surrounds both the development of unconventional computing and the
relationship between scientific theory and computation (Section 6.4).
Not everything that supports a scientific representation supports a compu-
tational one. In this way, pancomputationalism is taken out of the picture by
AR theory (Section 6.4.1). The connection between the physical system and
an abstract representation is not in general coextensive: The physical system
will have properties not captured in the abstract representation, and the abstract
representation may have properties not realized in the physical system. Failing
to take these differences into account gives rise to problems both of the exis-
tence of “side-channels” (Section 6.4.2) and the more extravagant claims of
hypercomputing abilities (Section 6.4.3).
AR theory allows us to show the fundamental relationship between scientific
and computational models, whilst preserving their necessary distinctiveness.
Without this, a physical theory of computation tends to flounder. AR theory
forms the backbone of a new framework for the foundations of computer sci-
ence, treating this mutual relation between distinct models as fundamental: a
natural science of computing.
6.2. Introduction to AR Theory
6.2.1 Science and Ontology
Key Role of Representation Natural science can be viewed, at its basic level,
as concerning objects from two distinct domains. Objects, processes, and sys-
tems within the physical world are the subject of scientific theories scrutinized
during experimental observations, and may be manipulated during experimen-
tal tests. Abstract objects are used to model these physical systems within
the domain of mathematics, logic, or any other language of the sciences. The
fundamental operation of science is this modeling of a physical object by an
abstract one: the process of representation (Frigg 2006; van Fraassen 2008).
This conception of science, and the crucial role of representation, is the starting
point for the framework of AR theory.
Figure 6.1 illustrates a physical system represented as an abstract model.
This is a fundamental use of the representation relation RT , which quasi-
functionally relates physical objects to abstract ones; it is not a mathematical
function, as that would require both domain and range to be abstract. In
Figure 6.1, a glass bead is represented using RT as a volume V . In gen-
eral, we can talk about a domain P of physical objects and a domain M of
abstract objects. (We use boldface for physical objects, italics for abstract ones,
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Figure 6.1 A spherical glass bead represented by its volume V . The repre-
sentation relation RT relates the physical object to its abstract model, within
the theory T
and script for representations.) Representation is theory-dependent, which we
denote by the subscript T in RT . In this case, the theory is that of the classi-
cal mechanics of solid objects. If we were instead interested in the refractive
properties of a glass sphere, we would represent it by its refractive index and
surface geometry, and the theory would be classical optics.
There is no unique theory for a given physical system: Multiple theories can
have different forms of validity, depending on the properties of the physical
system in question, the degree to which they need to conform to experiment,
and the domain for which they are required to be applicable.
Representation, Ontology, and Realism The field of study of representation
in philosophy is vast. Since Rorty’s demolition of the notion of representation
as a simple mirroring of abstract and physical (Rorty 1979), the nature and
structure of different types of representation have been extensively explored.
AR theory’s representation is primarily that of scientific representation: The
physical world is fundamental, and representation is structure given abstractly
on top of it. As used here, it does not come pre-loaded with implications of
intentionality or meaning; it is, at its most fundamental, a mapping from phys-
ical to abstract. We almost never talk about “information” or “knowledge” or
“meaning” in using AR theory. AR theory draws strongly on the framework
for scientific representation explored by van Fraassen (2008), and with many
similarities (as a more developed framework) to the basic modeling theory of
Hughes (1997). For a philosophical overview of models in science, see, for
example, Suppes (1960) and Frigg and Hartmann (2016).
Views of computation that regard it as the manipulation of representation
have historically come from a semantic account of computation; see, for exam-
ple Putnam (1960) and Fodor (1975). This comes out of an emphasis on the
similarities between computation and cognition, thought, and language use.
The abstract – thoughts, representation, language – is considered primary. The
set of all objects is the set of abstractions: “The facts in logical space are the
world” (Wittgenstein 1922, prop. 1.13). In such a view, if anything is to be
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called into question, then it is the existence of the physical world. At best this
is idealism; at worst, hard-line logical positivism.
This concept of computation, as closely allied with cognition and a philoso-
phy of logic and language, is the opposite of our starting-point for AR theory: a
computation is abstract; a computer is physical. The question is not “what types
of abstract states and processes form computations?” but now “which physical
systems are computing?” We assume the existence of a physical world. This is
the space of all physical objects, P. Idealist-leaning, nominalist, or verification-
alist projects fail ultimately in their inability to abstract out ongoing and neces-
sary interaction with an external world. Carnap’s project for a basic sense-data
language (Carnap 1950a) – which can be viewed in computer science terms as
analogous to a universal concrete semantics– failed in ways that make it clear
it cannot succeed. Following Quine (1971), our epistemology is naturalized:
how abstract content interfaces with physical reality is found by interrogat-
ing our best scientific theories. In AR theory this also includes representation:
Representation is always within the framework of a physical theory.
We do not use a cognitive starting-point for representation and computa-
tion in AR theory, but we do not reject outright the applicability of questions
around intention and mental representation to notions of computing. The rela-
tionship between abstract computation and physical computer is the mind/body
problem du jour, and questions of computation and cognition have a lot to
say to each other. AR theory draws on many aspects of the long tradition
of work around the abstract/physical divide concerning both mind/body and
theory/reality in science, prioritizing the latter pair rather than the former.
Such a notion of “naturalized representation” gives the starting-point for AR
theory: how representation functions within scientific theories. It is through
scientific representation that we come to computing. The physical world and
device are basic, and representation is structure in addition. This inversion of
the usual conception of representation is shown in the direction of its basic
mapping; RT : P → M, rather than an abstract object representing a physical
one, M → P.
AR theory starts from scientific realism, but need not end there. In terms
of realism, the AR framework gives a way to talk about the physical world P
without adding a structural commitment to one “foundational” or “fundamen-
tal” representation. It is not meant to solve all the issues of realist theories, but
to give a structure compatible with a solution. The level of basic physical ontol-
ogy in AR theory is very stripped down. The term “the physical world” can be
viewed as a placeholder for whatever the physical world is, not identical with
a representation of it. The aim here is to give a framework in which ontology
and representation are considered separately, and the threads of multiple rep-
resentations – physical, mathematical, computational, amongst others – can be
teased apart. This avoids identifying fundamental ontology with whatever our
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favorite physical theory says it is this week. It also avoids having to choose one
description as “more” fundamental than another (particles, fields, qubits, mem-
branes, etc.). This removes the question-begging presumption of a relationship
between different representations (“how can a collection of Fock spaces be
a computer?”) where there may be no such relationship. It also removes the
issue in the foundations of computer science where a physical computer is
frequently, and incorrectly, considered as identical with its concrete semantics.
By stripping the physical world of its representational structure, we are left
with what might be termed the “fundamental problem of representation.” P
is supposed to be the set of physical objects without representational struc-
ture, yet to write down “P” is to violate this by giving it a representation. One
response is to accept this necessary use of representation to perform commu-
nication as a Wittgensteinian ladder that is cheerfully kicked away after use.
A less glib response is to take the notion of a naturalized representation and
apply it to the whole system here: ontology is given by our best scientific the-
ories, not just in what it is represented as, but in what is considered to exist
physically.
This identification of that which is being represented as basic ontology nec-
essarily opens us up to criticism by pathological case. For example, empty
space is not presented in many physical theories, but becomes a thing-in-itself
in quantum field theories. A frequent response to these issues of realism is
scientific empiricism: what is being represented are events of observation. It
may well be that AR theory is compatible with such a view. In this case then
the domain P changes depending on context: It is, as it were, representational
turtles all the way down. This is the empiricist way van Fraassen (2008) views
scientific representation. It is also worth noting the fit between the commuting-
diagrammatic structure of AR theory, below, and Quinean notions of the “field
of force” at the edges of scientific theories where they make contact with
empirical reality (Quine 1951); the reader is invited there to view “the physical
world” as a convenient shorthand for empirical observations, if this better fits
their basic metaphysics. Otherwise, we note that any sane realist theory con-
tains a physical domain, and we continue to consider in AR theory how this
interfaces with the abstract representations that we use for it.
6.2.2 Prediction in Science
With the context established, let us see where such a framework can take
us. First, let us consider a physics experiment on a system p represented by
abstract model mp. The system evolves under some dynamics H as H(p) to
become p′. We have a theory of this process H; call it CT . Applying CT to
mp we obtain m′p. We would like to test our theory by finding out whether m′p
corresponds to the result of the experiment, p′. We cannot compare m′p to p′
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directly; we first have to use the representation relation RT on p′ to obtain mp′ .
This includes the process of measuring the outcome of the experiment. We can
then ask, does m′p = mp′ , and if not, what is the difference between them?
We do not need equality for CT to be a good theory of the dynamics of
p. No theory is perfect, and we have limited precision for our experimental
measurements. For CT to be a good theory, we just need “close enough,” say
|m′p−m| < ε for some suitable measure |.| and suitably small ε. This process is
illustrated in Figure 6.2, an example of an ε-commuting diagram, where theory
and experiment agree to within some parameter ε.
Of course, this is a vastly simplified picture of the scientific process, in
which many such diagrams interlock and underpin each other to build con-
fidence in theories through many different and repeated experiments. We are
most emphatically not claiming to have solved the philosophical questions of
how science is done, only that something like this must be part of the story.
All we need for our purposes here is that a “good theory,” however estab-
lished, can be described by a diagram like Figure 6.2. There are similarities
between AR diagrams and others used for describing physical computation,
especially those given by Ladyman et al. (2007), Maroney (private communi-
cation), and, in computer science, abstract interpretation (Cousot and Cousot
1977). However, AR representation (i) goes between physical and abstract,
not functionally from abstract to abstract, (ii) is directed, and (iii) includes
ε-closeness conditions.
Once we have a sufficiently good theory, we can use it to predict the behav-
ior of physical systems. Figure 6.3(a) shows an ε-commuting diagram with
both the physical system and the abstract model of its time evolution provid-
ing their outcome of the process. Figure 6.3(b) shows the use of the theory to
predict the behavior of the physical system, without actually carrying out the
physical process. From this, we can see that not only do experiments guide
Figure 6.2 A simple experiment in which a physical system p evolves under
some dynamics H to p′. The corresponding abstract representations mp and
mp′ are obtained using RT . The theory corresponding to the experiment CT
is used to calculate the expected outcome m′p, which is then compared with
mp′ , with resulting difference ε
“9781107171190c06” — 2018/1/29 — 15:44 — page 134 — #8
134 Dominic Horsman, Viv Kendon, and Susan Stepney
Figure 6.3 (a) A “good theory” has m′p ≈ mp′ ; (b) this allows the outcome
of a physical process to be predicted, without having to check by running the
experiment
Figure 6.4 (a) The engineering process: making a q from a p using process
H with theory CT ; (b) the instantiation relation R˜T is a shorthand for the
engineering process
the development of theories to explain their results, but theories can predict
the outcome of experiments that have not yet been carried out, suggesting
directions for new experiments. Both of these are observed as part of scientific
practice. Moreover, good theories are not only used to guide further scientific
research, they are also used to underpin new technology.
6.2.3 Technology and Engineering
Instantiation: Engineering an Artifact A good theory as illustrated in
Figure 6.3 tells our the outcome of H(p) without our having to do the
experiment. Furthermore, it tells us that we can reliably make a system p′
from a p using a process H(p) that we understand well through the the-
ory CT . This is engineering; again, we are not claiming to have solved the
philosophical questions around engineering. Our ability to make things from
detailed designs is unquestionable, evidenced by the multitude of high-tech
gadgets available for purchase in their millions. What is most relevant to the
development of our framework is that engineering effectively reverses the rep-
resentation arrow RT , allowing us to instantiate theoretical objects in certain
well-defined circumstances. This is illustrated in Figure 6.4(a), in which a
product q is made from raw material p. The theory provides the method for
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the engineering process H(p), and the abstract comparison m′p ≃ mq verifies
that the finished product q is sufficiently close to the theoretical specifica-
tion. We can abbreviate this by the instantiation relation R˜T , Figure 6.4(b),
in which the abstract model mq is instantiated as a physical object q. It is
important to note that representation and instantiation are not symmetric pro-
cesses: making models that represent physical systems is easier than making
physical objects that instantiate abstract models. In particular, it is possible to
devise unphysical abstract models that have no possible real-world physical
instantiation.
Using an Engineered Physical Artifact Given a “good theory,” we can use it
to engineer systems, in concert with instantiation as described above, and then
put them to use. For example, we probably want to test that our artifact does
in fact conform to the engineering specification for its intended use. Figure 6.5
illustrates this process.
Figure 6.5(a) shows the ε-commuting diagram with both use and theory
providing their outcomes of the process, allowing its suitability for the task
to be checked. Figure 6.5(b) shows the artifact used to predict the outcome
of the theory without actually carrying out the abstract calculations. This is
what normal use of an engineered artifact corresponds to: Our confidence in
the theory behind the engineering allows us to use the artifact without having
to check it will do what we want it to do.
While the full diagram for engineering in Figure 6.5(a) looks superficially
similar to the full diagram for science in Figure 6.3(a), there are fundamental
distinctions. The first difference is the starting point of the process: note the
instantiation arrow in Figure 6.5(a). For science, the starting point is a physi-
cal system to be modeled (represented) and understood. For engineering, the
starting point is a problem encoded into an abstract model (engineering specifi-
cation), to be engineered (instantiated) as the desired physical artifact. Science
starts with the physical systems, engineering starts with the abstract models.
The second difference is in the desired endpoint, or goal, of the scientific or
Figure 6.5 (a) A well-engineered system has m′p ≈ mp′ ; (b) this allows the
outcome of an abstract calculation (of the designed behavior of the physical
system) to be predicted without having to check by doing the abstract design
calculation
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engineering process. For science, the goal is a theory that describes reality suf-
ficiently well. For engineering, the goal is a physical artifact that meets the
specified design. Scientific goals are abstract, engineering goals are physical.
As a consequence of these different goals, the response to an insufficiently
small ε is different in science and engineering (once the possibility of a faulty
experiment or incorrect specification has been eliminated). In science, when
ε is too large, it means that the theory fails to adequately describe physical
reality, and so the theory needs to be improved. In engineering, when ε is
too large, it means that the engineered product fails to meet the theoretical
specification, and so the physical object needs to be improved.
6.2.4 Computing Technology
Abstract Prediction Computers are one type of physical system among the
many and varied things that we engineer. However, they differ in one funda-
mental way from the engineered artifacts described above. For computing, the
goal is to carry out an abstract computation that is (in general) unrelated to the
details of the physical computer. We can now use our framework to address our
original question about when a physical system computes. Figure 6.6 shows a
physical system p carrying out an abstract computation CT . Note that we are
not here addressing what explicitly characterizes this abstract computation (for
which see, for example, Piccinini [2015, 2017] on semantic accounts of phys-
ical computation); rather, we are addressing the question of when we can say
that a physical system is computing an abstract computation.
In Figure 6.6, mp is the encoding of our problem into a suitable abstract
computational model; we discuss the encoding stage in more detail shortly.
Given this abstractly encoded problem mp, we instantiate it in the physical
computer p and let it run. If successful, the result p′ can be inspected to obtain
the abstract answer.
While the full diagram for using an engineered artifact in Figure 6.5(a) is
identical to the full diagram for computation in Figure 6.6(a), there is again a
Figure 6.6 (a) A well-engineered instantiated computer has m′p ≈ mp′ for
computations it is capable of performing; (b) this allows the outcome of an
abstract computation (the desired goal of computation) to be predicted
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Table 6.1 The essential differences between science, engineering, and
computation: start: whether the starting point is a physical system p, or
an abstract specification mp; goal: whether the desired goal is a physical
system p, or an abstract result mp; ε too large: what part must be
changed to make ε sufficiently small
start goal ε too large
science: physical abstract change mp
engineering: abstract physical change p
computation: abstract abstract change p
fundamental difference, and again this is in what is considered the goal of the
process. For engineering, the goal is a physical object that meets the specified
design. For computing, the goal is an abstract result of a computation. Engi-
neering results are physical, while computational results are abstract. These
differences are summarized in Table 6.1.
Performing a computation is a form of engineering where the desired result
is an abstract representation rather than the physical system itself.
Encoding and Decoding Our initial discussion of physical computation above
skips over some important details. Unlike the science and engineering dia-
grams so far, where the physical system p has been directly represented by the
model mp, we now have an abstract calculation that is initially unrelated to the
physical computer or our model of the computer. The calculation problem may
be the reason that the computer has been engineered in the first place (as with
the earliest computers, or with modern specific-use devices), or it may be a
new problem that the user has reason to believe is amenable to being solved
on existing hardware. In either case, there is though no a priori connection
between the abstract specification of the problem, c, and the abstract speci-
fication of the computer, mp. This connection is to be found in the process of
encoding. Figure 6.7 shows a physical computer p being used to do calculation
c. Since c is in general unrelated to the computer we want to use, the first step is
to map the calculation onto the model of the computer mp. This encoding step
includes checking that the computer is capable of representing the calculation
(i.e., has enough memory and a suitable set of operations).
A modern programmable computer has a lot of existing programs (software,
apps) to assist with the process of encoding a new problem, each of them
running their own computations, resulting in many nested computational pro-
cesses. It is easier to see how the basic encoding process works on a simpler
computer, such as a pocket calculator. Suppose we have a restaurant bill for
£93.47 that we need to divide equally between seven guests (thereby ignoring
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Figure 6.7 Using physical system p to carry out the abstract computation c
complications of who had the rice). The sequence of button presses 9 3 . 4
7 ÷ 7 = will, on most calculators, result in it displaying the answer. That
is an almost trivial encoding where the calculation can be entered straight into
the calculator.
In general the result will need to be decoded from the abstract representation
mp′ of the final computer state p′. In the case of the restaurant bill, the decoding
is again straightforward. Reading the display you announce that each person
owes £13.36. The decoding you do is to interpret the array of seven segment
displays as a number, then add the “£” to that number to interpret it as an
amount of money. And you also rounded the amount up to a full penny, because
amounts of money smaller than this are not useful for settling a restaurant bill.
Encoding and decoding are important steps in physical computation. Indeed,
one of the characteristics of the associated representational processes is that
there is an element of choice about the encoding. The possibility of differ-
ent choices implies both that the same abstract computation can be carried
out on different physical computers, and that the same physical computer
can in general carry out different computations. What is important is that the
computational semantics of the operations is given by the information that is
processed by them, and that there are different choices of the physical process
by which that happens. The possibility of different choices is one of the ways
by which we can see that computation is indeed happening.
6.2.5 Representational Entities for Computation
AR theory enables us to specify the elements of representation and the inter-
play of physical and abstract that happen during the use of computers by human
beings. It is not, however, restricted to this. A common, if unsatisfactory,
counter to pancomputationalism is to restrict the definition of a computing sys-
tem to one used by conscious users via a definition of information (processing)
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that is strongly semantic and intentional; see, for example, Bar-Hillel and
Carnap (1953) and Mackay (1969).
AR theory does not do this. Within AR theory, the requirement is not for a
human being, or even an entity that can think or communicate; the requirement
is for representation. We thus do not need to take a position in the ongoing dis-
cussions of whether representation requires a thinking or human entity, and
we refer to the compute cycle requirement as a representational entity. As we
discuss in Section 6.2.1, we take a realist view: Whatever the ultimate ontol-
ogy of “abstract” objects is, there is only ever access to represented objects
through physical systems capable of supporting representation. The paradigm
example is the human brain: We use representation to model physical objects
in the world around us (including ourselves) as abstract notions. This repre-
sentation happens, though, in the physical brain, for example, when a human
uses a laptop computer. In such a case, we are the physical entities using the
representation relation: We are the representational entities.
Thus, we have two conceptually distinct, but not necessarily physically dis-
tinct, physical entities. First, there is the physical object p, as labeled in the
diagrams in Section 6.2, that participates in representational activity (be it
science, engineering, computing). Second, there is the representational entity
e (denoted with bold font as, ex hypothesi, the representational entity must
be physical) that supports the representation relation RT it is using for p.
We say that the system comprising p, e, and RT forms a closed representa-
tional system. If the cycle is a compute cycle, then this system forms a closed
computational system: the system is computing.
In AR theory, the locatedness of the representational entity is important for
determining the type of representational activity happening in a system. If the
system comprising p and RT does not include the physical representational
entity e, that is, if p and e are physically as well as conceptually distinct, then
we say that the system is open under representation. In all the examples of
human-designed computer use given above, the steps that go across the divide
between physical and abstract (the representational and instantiational steps)
all rely on a human representational entity. This entity is separate from the sys-
tem that is the computer. So in human-designed computing, the computer alone
(laptop, Difference Engine, slime mold, etc.) does not form a closed represen-
tational system: The representational entity is separate from the computing
device, and not even necessarily co-located with it. Human-designed comput-
ers are open under representation, and require a human representational entity
to close them.
Identifying the steps in a computation (or other representational activity)
will identify the representational entity. Horsman et al. (in press) argue that it
is possible to have a closed computational system without a human represen-
tational entity, analyzing the example of a bacterium performing chemotaxis,
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that is, changing its direction of motion towards a source of food. In such a
closed computational system there are additional challenges to identifying the
computational steps: a non-human representational entity cannot communicate
to us that it is using representation. It therefore falls to us to determine if the
system under consideration is itself using representation. That is, can we rep-
resent it as a closed representational system? We do not assign ourselves as the
representational entities here: Rather, we determine whether we can describe
the entire system as using the representational aspect of parts of itself in certain
processes. A physical system that becomes representational only when an RT
is given by a human observer is not a closed representational system.
Thus the AR framework is able to discriminate between computing behav-
ior and non-computing processes even in the absence of intelligent users or
designers. The representation relation is always used by some entity, though,
and it is that entity which is using the interfacing between abstract and physical
that is a key part of physical computation.
6.3. Identifying Computing with the AR Framework
With the AR framework on board, we can use it to generate criteria that distin-
guish “computers” from other elements of physical reality. One of our original
motivations for developing the theory is to provide a critical evaluation of pro-
posed unconventional computational devices. Here we apply it to slime mold
computation, which has received significant attention in the past decade. First,
we show how the framework describes our familiar digital computers, and also
one of the earliest computers, the Babbage Difference Engine. By identifying
the components that make up processes that are known to be computing, we
can then extend this into the territory of novel and unconventional computing.
Figure 6.7 shows the six essential components to an AR framework descrip-
tion of a computation: theory, encoding, instantiation, physical process,
representation, and decoding. For each example, we first list what each of
those components consist of, then discuss any issues that arise in identifying
the components.
6.3.1 Classical Digital Computing
By classical digital computing, we mean the technology that underpins the
computers we use on our desks, as laptops, in our smartphones, running the
internet, and in many other types of technology, such as modern cars. We take
this to be computing, uncontroversially. By showing how the components fit
together to produce a compute cycle in this technology that is nowadays the
paradigm example of computing, we pave the way for demonstrating it in non-
standard devices.
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Theory: The theory of classical computing covers the hardware (including
how the transistors implement Boolean logic, and how the architecture imple-
ments the von Neumann model) and the software (including programming
language semantics, refinement, compilers, testing, and debugging).
Encode: The problem is encoded as a computational problem by making
design decisions and casting it in an appropriate formal representation.
Instantiate: Instantiation covers the hardware (building the physical com-
puter) and the software (downloading the program and instantiating it with
input data).
Run: The program executes on the physical hardware: The laws of physics
describe how the transistors, exquisitely arranged as processing units and
memory, and instantiated into a particular initial state, act to produce the sys-
tem’s final state when execution halts.
Represent: The final state of the physical system is represented as the abstract
result, for example, as the relevant numbers or characters.
Decode: The represented computational result is decoded into the problem’s
answer.
Despite the complexity of today’s computers, the underlying theory is highly
developed and well-understood, the result of years of development and testing
as each advance in functionality is introduced.
6.3.2 Babbage’s Difference Engine
There is ongoing debate about the first “true” human-designed computer
(with Stonehenge and the Antikythera mechanism, amongst others, vying
for the title). The Babbage Difference Engine is one of the first recogniz-
ably modern computing devices. In particular, it was the forerunner of the
Analytical Engine, the first proposed programmable machine with associated
programming, given by Lovelace (1843) as she laid the foundations of modern
computer science. The Difference Engine was, unlike the Analytical Engine,
actually built. It computes tables of logarithmic functions by approximating
them as sums of polynomials. It therefore needs to find the value of a func-
tion, e.g., f (x) = x − 12 x2, for a whole set of values x = 1, 2, 3, . . . It uses the
“method of differences” to change the problem into one of addition and sub-
traction, finding first the difference between subsequent function values (the
“first difference”), and then the difference between subsequent values of the
first difference (the “second difference”), and so on, a degree-n polynomial
having n differences. Essentially it mechanizes a difficult calculation (a loga-
rithm) by turning it into a relatively straightforward one (first into polynomials
and then into addition). The addition is performed physically by combining
the rotations from different cogs in the device, each of which is set to the
required input.
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Theory: The theory of the Difference Engine as a device comprises the theory
of how a set of interacting gears can generate an addition function. Crudely,
this can be thought of as combining the rotation of separate cogs (the inputs)
onto other cogs (the output). The Difference Engine theory also includes how
the addition operations for each difference combine to form the correct addi-
tion function to generate the next value of f (x).
Encode: The problem (calculate a logarithm) is encoded as an approximation
of sums of polynomial functions, which are in turn reduced to addition func-
tions.
Instantiate: The computation is instantiated firstly in the engineering of the
device itself: the hardware is not programmable. The input is then given by
turning the input dials to the settings that correspond to the first n values (usu-
ally around four) of the function f (x) to be determined.
Run: The Engine runs (powered by turning a crank handle). As the gears inter-
act, differences are calculated and then added.
Represent: The final position of the output gears is coupled to a “printer,”
whose written numerical output depends on the position of the cogs.
Decode: The value of the f (x) for the specific x computed by the Engine is
used to calculate the required logarithm (by hand).
The Difference Engine demonstrates how computation can occur without
full programmability. The Engine can perform only specific addition tasks,
given by its construction. Addition is “hard-coded” into the design of the phys-
ical device. The Engine performs a range of calculations by virtue of the fact
that it can take different inputs. This is one way we can see that the device
is processing information through its physical operation. The theory of the
device was originally developed to design clockwork. However, small differ-
ences between the physical system and the model originally made the operation
faulty, as errors cascaded through the system. While these are resolvable with
modern precision-engineering (for example, the Difference Engine in the Lon-
don Science Museum works with negligible errors), the much more sensitive
Analytic Engine has still not been constructed with a physical gearing that
matches the necessary precision of its theory.
6.3.3 Slime Mold Maze Solver
Adamatzky (2010) documents a range of computational uses for the slime
mold Physarum polycephalum. Nakagaki et al. (2000) describe the observa-
tion of the slime mold finding the shortest path through a maze. That work is
described in experimental terms: testing a theory of slime mold behavior in the
presence of food.
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The maze to be solved is implemented as a small physical structure, a few
centimeters across, suitable for a slime mold to inhabit (Figure 6.8). The tested
maze has multiple possible routes and several dead ends. Initially, the slime
mold is grown to fill the whole of the maze. Then blocks of slime mold food,
oat flakes in agar, are placed at the entrance and exit of the maze. The behavior
of the slime mold is then observed over the next few hours. Having discovered
the food, it withdraws from the dead ends of the maze and concentrates along
the shortest path(s) between the two food blocks. After four hours, the slime
mold has withdrawn from all the maze dead ends, but still exists along parallel
alternative paths. After eight hours, the slime mold has withdrawn from the
longer parallel routes, and has found the shortest path.
Now having evidence for that theory, we can exploit the same process to
compute the shortest path.
Theory: Slime mold forms a minimum-length body between food sources, as
a consequence of the way its contraction frequency changes in the presence of
food (for which see references cited in Nakagaki et al. [2000]).
Encode: If the abstract problem is to compute the shortest path through the
maze, or simply any path through the maze, the encoding is essentially trivial:
c = mp. If the maze abstraction is a more indirect analog of some other prob-
lem, the encoding would be more complex. Analogs tend to be fairly direct
encodings, exploiting a clear analogy.
Figure 6.8 The slime mold Physarum polycephalum physically computing a
path through a maze: diagram after Nakagaki et al. (2000). The dark areas
are the maze walls; the pale regions are the maze. The gray squares indicate
the position of the oat-flake-containing agar food blocks at the entrance and
exit of the maze. (a) Multiple paths: on the left (“α routes”) the solid path
fragment is 20 percent shorter than the dashed path; on the right (“β routes”),
the solid path is 2 percent shorter than the dashed path. At the initial state
of the physical system p, the maze is filled with slime mold; (b) half way
through execution, after four hours: the slime mold (marked as a line) has
shrunk and moved out of all the maze dead ends; (c) the final state of the
system p′: after eight hours, the slime mold has found the shortest path
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Instantiate: This has three main parts: build a physical maze that instantiates
the abstract maze problem from materials supporting slime mold reconfigura-
tion; place food sources (oat flakes) at the entry and exit positions; cover the
maze with pieces of slime mold.
Run: Allow the slime mold pieces to coalesce into a single organism, and
then wait for it to contract to the shortest path through the maze. The reported
system took approximately eight hours to run, on a maze of approximately
4× 4 cm.
Represent: Read off the final position of the slime mold in the maze, which
requires the use of image processing to detect, and represent this as the posi-
tion in the abstract maze.
Decode: Decode the abstract slime mold position into a route through the
maze.
In this example of unconventional computation, we can see how the AR
framework allows us to analyze the claims of computation.
There is first an issue at the level of the theory: The minimization is approx-
imate. Nakagaki et al. (2000) report results from 19 experiments. In two cases
no path formed. In three cases the slime mold did not fully contract, occupying
all branches. When it did contract to a single route, for the β routes differing
by only 2 percent, it chose the shorter route five times and the longer route six
times. When it contracted to a single α route, which differ by 20 percent, it
always chose the shorter route. So the theory would be better stated that the
slime mold contracts to approximately the shortest path, most of the time, for
mazes of this size. Hence, to use this system as a computer, we have to be
willing to accept a quite large ε, and run the computation several times. Addi-
tionally, there is no evidence that the approach can be scaled to large mazes. It
requires further scientific experiments to determine the domain of applicability
and the degree of approximation. Note also the potentially considerable com-
putation required in the form of image processing during the representation
stage for detecting the position of the slime mold within the maze. Such addi-
tional computation needs to be considered when calculating the computational
power of a physical device.
In this slime mold example, there is no clear distinction between computer
(hardware), program (software) and input data (configured run of software).
Moreover, the construction and programming effort can no longer be amortized
over a potentially unbounded number of runs. Zauner and Conrad (1996) argue
that one-shot “instance machines,” which can solve only a single instance of
a problem, have their advantages for certain substrates. Such machines avoid
the need for resetting to some initial configuration, and so the compute step
can irreversibly alter the state of the physical system, which is often a neces-
sity when using a complex biological substrate. However, the cost of each
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instantiation needs to be low for this to be a viable strategy, significantly lower
than the cost of a reusable computer for the same problem.
6.4. Distinguishing Representation(s) and Reality
We have seen in Section 6.3 how AR theory allows us to analyze specific
systems for their computational activities. Separating out physical system,
physical theory, and computational representations enables us to identify when
all these elements, and the necessary connections between them, are present.
This separation, and AR theory in general, can also be used to help design
unconventional computer architectures, and to address some issues and claims
about computation.
Both the abstract model mp and the physical system p are essential com-
ponents of AR theory, as are the instantiation and representation relations
between them. Failing to properly distinguish which claims are about the
abstract model and which are about the physical system can cause confusion.
Confusion also arises by failing to differentiate claims about different abstract
representations.
6.4.1 Pancomputational Rocks Aren’t
Pancomputationalism is the view that everything – rocks, hurricanes, planetary
systems, galaxies – are computing systems (Piccinini 2017).
The weak form of pancomputationalism holds that every system is com-
puting (at least) itself. Consider the claim of a rock computing “itself” in the
framework of AR theory, Figure 6.6. The rock is the physical system p. But in
this context there is, importantly, no representational entity e and hence no rep-
resentation relation RT . So there is no encoding of a computational problem,
no relevant abstract model mp representing p, no instantiation of that model as
the rock, no representation of the rock’s final state back to an abstract result,
and no decoding of that abstract result into the solution of the problem. There
is only the physical rock p, which does not form a closed computational system
(Section 6.2.5).
One might try to argue that the rock is its own representational entity, that
p = e. As we argue elsewhere (Horsman et al. in press), in AR theory such
a claim requires us to demonstrate representational activity occurring. As we
show in that paper, this is a highly non-trivial process requiring the active and
explicit use of representation intrinsic to a system’s processes. Even for organ-
isms such as bacteria it is controversial to claim representational activity. It
is highly implausible that the criteria can be established for rocks. In the AR
theory definition, systems do not compute themselves for themselves, because
they do not represent themselves.
“9781107171190c06” — 2018/1/29 — 15:44 — page 146 — #20
146 Dominic Horsman, Viv Kendon, and Susan Stepney
The strong form of pancomputationalism holds that every physical sys-
tem performs a combinatorially vast number of computations, of every finite
automaton that its microstate can encode through some tabular representation
(Putnam 1988). Again, consider the claim of a rock computing one of these
automata in the framework of AR theory, Figure 6.6. Again, the rock is the
physical system p. Now there is a representational entity e: a person pointing at
the rock, allegedly encoding their problem, and decoding the result, by using a
representation of the rock’s relevant microstate, establishing the relevant table
defining the automaton.
Despite the existence of all the components in the theory in this case, there
is nevertheless an issue. All the “computation” of establishing the mapping
from rock states to table entries is being done in the representation stage: the
rock itself has computed none of this. The representational entity could equally
well have pointed to any rock; a different representational mapping would be
needed, and would need to be computed in its entirety without the aid of the
indicated rock. One might equally say that a broken clock is measuring the
time: we observe the final state of the broken clock, but then we must use
another clock to establish the correct representation of its broken state: All the
measurement of the amount of time that has passed is being done in the repre-
sentation (using a second clock); the broken clock has measured none of this.
Again, the identified components p, e, and RT do not form a closed compu-
tational system: A further computer is needed, and performs the totality of the
purported computation. This contrasts with the case of a clock that is known
to be, say, five minutes slow. Its physical state can be represented abstractly
by e as one that is five minutes later in time than the standard representation
would suggest. Alternatively, e could use the standard representation, and then
decode the resulting abstract state by adding the five minutes. Here e is respon-
sible for only a small, and well-determined, amount of computation to perform
the representation and decoding.
So according to AR theory, there is no pancomputationalism, either weak or
strong. For computation to occur at all, we require a representational entity,
instantiation, and representation, in addition to the physical processes. For
these identified representational entity, physical system, and representation
relation to be sufficient to be performing the purported computation, they must
additionally form a closed computational system. Rocks don’t.
6.4.2 The Representation is Less than Physical Reality: Side Channels
The abstract model is just that: a model. It necessarily omits details about the
physical system it is modeling, and may make simplifying assumptions. Other
models, and their corresponding representations, are possible. Mathematical
“9781107171190c06” — 2018/1/29 — 15:44 — page 147 — #21
Abstraction/Representation Theory 147
model. If the physical system is richer, it can exhibit behavior not represented
by the model, or the proofs. In particular, if a different model is used for a
given physical system, with its own representation, different properties may
hold than in the original model.
For example, a particular system, such as a crypto system, may be proved
secure. Such a proof is performed at the abstract level, and may depend on
assumptions about the physical system, particularly assumptions about what
can be observed (and so represented) about the physical system. Different
models support different observations; hence these may break the assumptions
underlying the mathematical proofs.
Such alternative observations in the case of security systems, for exam-
ple timing observations (Kocher 1996), are called side channels, and many
kinds exist (Clark et al. 2005). The original analysis of kinds of side-channel
in Clark et al. (2005) was performed purely in the context of abstract-level
refinement concepts, although physical issues were considered. AR theory can
augment such analyses by exploiting its clear distinction between physical-to-
abstract representation relations and abstract-to-abstract mathematical refine-
ment relations, helping to expose where properties can be subverted and
attacked.
6.4.3 The Representation is More Than Physical Reality:
Hypercomputation
The AR theory diagram only “ε-commutes”; there may be small differences
between the desired computational result and the physically computed result.
Digital systems are designed to commute exactly: Because a physical gap is
engineered between the instantiation of abstract 0 and 1, small errors in the
physical system either do not lead to errors in the representation and decoding,
or can be identified and corrected. In contrast, continuous analog systems are
not exact and have no such gap, hence errors can propagate.
When deducing properties of a computational system, it is important to real-
ize that the abstract model can have different properties from the physical
system. In particular, abstract models of “continuous” systems often model
state variables using real numbers. This does not mean that the physical sys-
tem somehow “implements” such real numbers. That this is so can be readily
seen in some cases. For example, Lotka-Volterra-style predator-prey models
(Wangersky 1978) use a real-valued variable to model the population size using
a continuum approximation. The population size is in reality a discrete quan-
tity, and such models break down when the continuum approximation is no
longer valid. For another example, the Banach-Tarski paradox (Wagon 1985;
Wapner 2005) is a theorem that states that it is possible to take a sphere, par-
tition it into a finite number of pieces, and reassemble those pieces into two
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spheres each the same size as the original; the proof relies on properties of the
reals that cannot be exploited to double a physical ball of material made of
discrete atoms.
An (abstract) real number potentially has infinite information content.
Claims of hypercomputing (systems that can compute some non-Turing com-
putable functions) and super-Turing computing (systems that can compute
some Turing-computable functions with exponential speedup over Turing
Machines) that rely on this infinite information content being physically acces-
sible appear to be confusing the mathematical real number power of the
abstract model with the physical capabilities of the modeled physical system
(Broersma et al. in press). If that abstract content could be exploited physically,
it would lead to these claimed forms of hypercomputing and super-Turing
computing. However, there is no evidence that physical systems can do this:
infinite-precision real-valued variables cannot be instantiated in a physical
material system. Physical variables such as position and momentum are clas-
sically modeled using real values, yet according to our current best physical
theories, in particular quantum theory, the physical world is ultimately dis-
crete, and so the set of values these variables can take is ultimately countable,
and do not form a continuum. The real numbers used in the abstract model are
just that: a model.
AR theory, with its careful distinction between the physical system and its
abstract model, helps us to analyze the claimed computational power of vari-
ous systems, determining whether the power is part of the abstract model, the
physical device, or the representation relation.
6.5. Summary
Landauer (1996) famously claimed that “information is physical.” The physical
nature of computing has been acknowledged by the unconventional com-
puting community, but computer science in general has hitherto viewed its
subject matter to be one of mathematics and logic, relegating the physical
details of computing devices to engineering. As various forms of non-standard
computing come to prominence, in particular quantum and Internet-based tech-
nologies, this division has become increasingly untenable. Various fields from
physics to biology to the social sciences have begun to import the language
of information processing to describe their model systems in ways that are at
odds with the usual foundations of computer science. AR theory allows us to
bridge this divide, and to put the physical nature of computing devices back
into the core of computer science, while also preserving its specific domain
of applicability. Demonstrating the foundational part physical devices play in
computing is not to extend the definition of “computer” to encompass every
“9781107171190c06” — 2018/1/29 — 15:44 — page 149 — #23
Abstraction/Representation Theory 149
physical object. Computing is physical, but not everything that is physical
computes.
The natural scientific description of a physical system and its computational
description share many important properties. Both are model representations
of the underlying physical system. They can relate to each other, and to the
system being modeled, in a number of different ways. Carefully distinguish-
ing these allow us to find when a physical system can support a computational
representation, and when it is, in fact, being used as a computer. This is a
complex process: A number of important criteria must be met, with, fundamen-
tally, representation occurring and being used in specific ways in the physical
system. Differences between physical system, physics-based models, and com-
putational representations gives rise to many of the problematic behaviors of
computing systems: side-channel attacks, over-ambitious claims of computing
power, and lack of clarity about what in a computer is computing and when.
AR theory gives a framework in which all these claims can be defined and then
analyzed. This opens the field for a formal computer science of unconventional
devices, and for a new foundational understanding of the relationship between
computation and the physical sciences.
Acknowledgments
DH and VK are supported by EPSRC under Grant EP/L022303/1. SS acknowl-
edges partial funding by the EU FP7 FET Coordination Activity TRUCE
(Training and Research in Unconventional Computation in Europe), project
reference number 318235. We thank the various referees for their detailed
comments, which have helped improve this chapter.
“9781107171190c06” — 2018/1/29 — 15:44 — page 150 — #24
